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Abstract: This study analyses the de facto emerging intra-school competition between the Israeli 
Ministry of Education (MOE) and external organisations at public Israeli secondary schools by 
exploring science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) programmes. Given on-going 
privatisation processes within the education system, the participation of external organisations in 
schools has become significant, greatly affecting municipalities’ authority and schools principals’ 
autonomy. This case-study provides a comprehensive examination of this new form of intra-school 
competition and its possible impact on schools, based on in-depth interviews with school principals, 
representatives of STEM programmes, and officials at the MOE and a local education authority, as 
well as analysis of supporting documents. We show that despite its supposed regulatory role, the 
MOE is pushed to function as an additional player in this quasi-market, competing with external 
organisations and substituting its regulatory roles for additional market-player opportunities. 
Theoretical and empirical implications are suggested.  
Keywords: privatization; NGOs; schools, competition 
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Lógica de mercado en la escuela: Competencia intraescolar emergente entre 
programas privados y públicos de STEM en Israel 
Resumen: Este estudio analiza la competencia intrafamiliar emergente de facto entre el 
Ministerio de Educación israelí (MOE) y organizaciones externas en escuelas secundarias 
públicas israelíes mediante la exploración de programas de ciencia, tecnología, ingeniería y 
matemáticas (STEM). Debido a los continuos procesos de privatización dentro del sistema 
educativo, la participación de organizaciones externas en las escuelas se ha vuelto 
significativa, afectando en gran medida la autonomía de los directores de las escuelas y las 
autoridades municipales. Este estudio de caso proporciona un examen exhaustivo de esta 
nueva forma de competencia intraescolar y su posible impacto en las escuelas, en base a 
entrevistas en profundidad con los directores de las escuelas, representantes de los 
programas STEM y funcionarios del Ministerio de Educación y una autoridad educativa 
local, así como el análisis de documentos de respaldo. Mostramos que a pesar de su 
supuesta función reguladora, el Ministerio de Educación se ve obligado a funcionar como 
un jugador adicional en este cuasimercado, compitiendo con organizaciones externas y 
sustituyendo sus funciones reguladoras por oportunidades adicionales para los jugadores 
del mercado. Se sugieren implicaciones teóricas y empíricas. 
Palabras clave: privatización; NGOs; escuelas, competencia 
 
Lógica de mercado na escola: Competição intra-escolar emergente entre programas 
STEM privados e públicos em Israel 
Resumo: Este estudo analisa a concorrência intra-escolar de fato emergente entre o 
Ministério de Educação de Israel (MOE) e organizações externas em escolas públicas 
israelenses secundárias, explorando programas de ciência, tecnologia, engenharia e 
matemática (STEM). Dados os processos de privatização em curso dentro do sistema 
educacional, a participação de organizações externas nas escolas tornou-se significativa, 
afetando em grande parte a autoridade dos municípios e a autonomia dos diretores das 
escolas. Este estudo de caso fornece um exame abrangente desta nova forma de 
competição intra-escolar e seu possível impacto nas escolas, com base em entrevistas em 
profundidade com diretores de escola, representantes de programas STEM e funcionários 
do Ministério da Educação e uma autoridade local de educação. bem como a análise de 
documentos comprovativos. Mostramos que, apesar de seu suposto papel regulador, o 
MOE é forçado a funcionar como um participante adicional nesse quase-mercado, 
competindo com organizações externas e substituindo seus papéis reguladores por 
oportunidades adicionais de mercado. Implicações teóricas e empíricas são sugeridas.  
Palavras-chave: privatização; NGOs; escolas, competição 
Introduction 
In recent decades, neoliberal public policies have become more common in education 
systems worldwide, contributing to the privatisation and decentralisation of formerly centrally 
managed education systems (Ball, 2009). Neoliberalism in this sense broadly applies to the “the 
agenda of economic and social transformation under the sign of the free market” (Connell, 2013, p. 
100). The implementation of market logic is reflected in the diverse modes of privatisation within 
and among education systems (Hursh & Martina, 2016), as well as in the reduced role of 
governments in delivering and regulating education services. This change takes place alongside the 
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increasing involvement of external agencies1 in education systems (Almog-Bar & Zychlinski, 2012; 
Hursh & Martina, 2016; Savas, 2005; Yemini, 2017; Yemini & Sagie, 2015).  
The involvement of external organisations in the education system tends to be considered 
indicative of the state’s inability to provide education services (Eden, 2012; Rose, 2009). Despite the 
public perception of the government as legally and socially responsible for the provision of 
education, the governmental role is reduced constantly due to on-going decentralisation in many 
education systems. In conjunction, expanded autonomy is delegated to local authorities and, 
gradually, to the schools themselves (Lubienski, 2003; Nir, 2009). Much has been written on the 
competition between the public and private schools in general as a result of partial privatisation 
processes (Lubienski, 2005; Rowe & Lubienski, 2017) and within specific contexts (Verger, Bonal, & 
Zancajo, 2016). The present study contributes to this body of literature by showing how such 
competition can actually persist within public schools themselves, as external agencies effectively 
penetrate the public domain of schooling, which supposedly remains under the full, exclusive 
control of the Ministry of Education (MOE).  
We focus on Israel as a case-study. Israel was originally established with a strong social 
democratic vision. Yet this vision has eroded over the years; since the 1980s, the Israeli MOE  
gradually embraced neoliberal ideas of decentralisation and privatisation (Addi-Raccah, 2015). 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of the education provision in Israel is still public. External 
organisations are criticised publicly and sometimes even banned, especially when they become 
involved in issues related to religious education (Sagie & Yemini, 2017; Sagie, Yemini, & Bauer, 
2016; Yemini, Cegla, & Sagie, 2018). Moreover, most NGOs offering educational services in Israel 
are funded or willing to be funded by the state, thus gaining even greater access to the field. 
External agencies and organisations have stepped up their involvement in the Israeli 
education system recently as a result of cuts in education budgets, alongside public demands to 
expand and diversify educational offerings in schools, due to the perceived failure of Israeli students 
in standardised examinations (Berkovich & Foldes, 2012; Gidron at el., 2004; Pizmony-Levy, 2017; 
Yemini & Gordon, 2017). Such organisations mainly supply extracurricular and supplementary 
remedies within the system. Moreover, the MOE’s continuous attempts to organise this field are 
only partially successful; organisations often manage to facilitate interactions with schools absent any 
regulation.  
Frequently, external organisations must benefit various interest groups such as the MOE, 
municipalities, and schools; this ability to act upon differing agendas grants them with an image of 
promoters of innovation and change within schools (Dvir et al., 2017; Yemini, 2017). On the other 
hand, integration of external organisations into schools creates complex power dynamics between 
the various interest groups with misaligned interests (Sagie, Yemini, & Bauer, 2016; Yemini, Cegla, & 
Sagie, 2018; Yemini & Sagie, 2015). Indeed, the complicated relations between the Israeli education 
system and external organisations remain unsettled (Almog Bar, 2016; Ichilov, 2009; Weinheber et 
al., 2008; Yemini, 2017), despite the significant growth in the number of organisations operating 
within schools (Eden, 2012).  
Although the contemporary research on privatisation in public schools is flourishing (Ball, 
2012), in Israel this topic yet to receive significant attention (Klein & Shimoni-Hershkoviz, 2016). 
Moreover, while such research often focuses on privatisation that occurs outside the schools 
(notable exceptions are Brehm & Silova, 2014; Yemini, Cegla, & Sagie, 2018) and with official 
                                                 
1 In this study, we consider such entities to include organisations (both for-profit and nonprofit—
international, national, and local foundations, intermediaries, and NGOs) and individual consultants external 
to the public education system, who take an active role in the planning, delivery, and assessment of public 
education.  
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support from policymakers (e.g., the establishment of charter schools in the US; Lubienski, 2005) 
this line of research only tells part of the story. Here, we show how privatisation may develop within 
public schools—where initially, private actors were supposed to complement the governmental 
provision of extracurricular activities or remedial assistance, but actually, they now compete with the 
Ministry of Education over the same (internal) resources and students. We focus on one such case, 
showing the dynamics of the competition emerging and examining the perceptions of this 
educational realm from various stakeholders’ perspectives. 
Neoliberal Governance of Education 
In recent years, most western countries seem to have gradually adopted market-conforming 
principles as a dominant governance mode, in addition to or instead of the traditional welfare state 
model that was common in western democracies after the Second World War (Peters, 2017; 
Rowlands & Rawolle, 2013; Verger, 2012). Neoliberal approaches promote a democratic discourse 
of choice and competition and encourage policies of political, economic, and educational 
decentralisation (Ichilov, 2012). The adoption of neoliberal principles and decentralisation processes 
produced free-market activities in areas traditionally under governmental oversight, such as welfare 
and education; ultimately, they encouraged privatisation in these fields (Au & Ferrare, 2015; Hursh 
& Martina, 2016; Svallfors & Tyllström, 2017).  
Implementation of neoliberal principles in education, alongside decentralisation policies, 
enabled decision-making autonomy at the municipal level and gradually also within schools 
themselves; the responsibility for providing educational services was transferred from the 
government and local authorities to school principals (Robertson & Dale, 2002). Verger, Bonal, and 
Zancajo (2016) claim that a steering away from the public education system also promoted this 
growing autonomy at the school and municipal level. Nevertheless, they argue that the public school 
system still impedes schooling’s effectiveness by setting targets and action steps that do not 
necessarily benefit the students and do not allow the school staff adequate flexibility (or 
opportunity) to use their professional judgement in the workspace. As such, schools’ abilities to 
govern their affairs remain rather limited (Verger, 2012). Hence, adoption of market based patterns 
of governance—notably, creating competition amongst schools—may enable schools to generate 
better ‘customer’ responses, forcing them to provide higher quality education services (Verger, 
Bonal, & Zancajo, 2016). In this ‘quasi-market’ model, schools are forced to operate in a semi-
competitive marketplace and compete against one another for the opportunity to succeed and even 
survive (Lubienski, 2005).   
Concepts such as ‘innovation,’ ‘choice,’ ‘competition,’ and ‘diversity,’ which previously 
belonged exclusively to various commercial fields, have become significant features of the 
educational arena (Lubienski, 2003). Moreover, the elements of a free market became objectives of 
formal education in themselves (Lubienski, 2003). Advocates of this quasi-market model consider 
choice and competition between various schools and municipalities to be legitimate, in that they 
encourage effective, higher-quality education systems (Belfield & Levin, 2002; Hoxby, 2000). 
However, Allen and Burgess’s (2010) study of competition’s effect on student achievements in four 
different countries (England, the USA, Sweden, and Chile) revealed that the common positive image 
of competition in education and the belief that it encourages student achievements may be 
inaccurate; in fact, these researchers found no real influence of competition on student 
achievements. Furthermore, although the free market is characterised by innovation and diversity 
based on competition, the quasi-market in education systems does not necessary provide innovation 
and diversity in the curriculum itself—especially in failed schools where competition is essentially 
irrelevant (Adnett & Davies, 2000; McShane & Hess, 2015). However, adapting the quasi-market 
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model exclusively to successful schools may yield negative social consequences, such as widening the 
gap between the higher achieving schools (and students) and those with lower achievements, and as 
a result harming society’s disadvantaged groups (Adnett & Davies, 2003). 
Bulkley and Burch (2011) argue that free-market principles in education reflect civil society’s 
attitude towards the economic market and the private sector’s ability to provide better, more 
effective solutions to the public sector. The quasi-market model allows entry into public education 
systems for new players, who receive access to public economic resources that previously were 
provided exclusively by governments (Fabricant & Fine, 2015). Accordingly, the introduction of 
these stakeholders tolerates the use of private economic resources within public education, as well as 
the borrowing of management approaches and principles from the business world (Verger, 
Lubienski, & Steiner-Khamsi, 2016). In this sort of privatisation process, the boundaries between 
private and public education become indistinct (Ball, 2009). This is not a technical change in the 
management of educational services’ supply, but rather a fundamental change in the educational 
process; the unrecognised privatisation that occurs without public attention may change the face of 
education, with far-reaching social implications. 
Indeed, educational privatisation processes are influenced by the interactions between 
schools and external organisations. Therefore, the involvement of external organisations in public 
schools should be examined, in a quest to understand the transformations that may come into effect 
at both the school level and the educational policy level. 
External Organisations within Public Education 
The aforementioned privatisation and the quasi-market processes have contributed to the 
creation of characteristics and conditions that allow incorporation of external organisations into the 
education field (Srivastava & Baur, 2016). As mentioned, the governmental role has subsided, and 
civil society began filling in this gap through third-party organisations that provide services and 
promote the interests of various individuals and groups. This phenomenon further contributed to 
privatisation processes in education. The substantial increase in the number of third-sector 
organisations attests to the civil society’s capacity to promote its interests and its ability to modulate 
governmental activities (Kamat, 2004).  
External organisations operate in the educational sphere to supplement, append, or challenge 
existing activity with services that have not received governmental recognition or funding; hence, 
they initiate new services (DeStefano & Moore, 2010), assist in the completion of certain services 
(Rose, 2009), or challenge the existing ones (Shiffer et al., 2010). The mutual interests of such 
external organisations and the government allow shared discourse, but also challenge the existing 
policy. Indeed, such external organisations have become key players in the public sector, generating 
a new reality of inter-sector collaboration that influences the government’s approach towards these 
organisations (Almog-Bar & Zychlinski, 2012).  
Indeed, the mere existence of external organisations casts some doubt on governments’ 
ability to provide quality educational services and has constituted a criticism of governmental 
conduct (Eden, 2012). Yet notably, the public continues to perceive the government as the morally, 
socially, and legally responsible entity in regard to education provision. Therefore, the government is 
expected to create a regulatory mechanism to monitor and manage partnerships with external 
organisations (Rose, 2009). Recently, however, school principals and municipalities gained 
autonomy, while regulation and governmental control decreased (Lubienski, 2003); these parallel 
trends enable pedagogical changes not anchored in policy but rather stemming from external 
organisations’ involvement in schools (Williamson, 2012). 
Such organisations’ involvement in and ability to influence schools largely depend on their 
relationship with the governmental or municipal decision-makers. These organisations may even 
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serve as intermediaries between governmental decision-makers and the educators responsible for 
carrying out decisions (Honig, 2004). They have the capacity to address the interests of different 
stakeholders (such as the MOE, the municipality, and schools) and therefore are perceived as ideal 
partners to promote innovation and change in schools. On the other hand, integration of external 
organisations into schools may create complex power relations between the different stakeholders, 
due to the proliferation of interests that may not coincide (Authors, 2015).  
External Organisations within Israeli Public Education: The Case of STEM Programmes 
The State of Israel was founded on a welfare state model, committed to the provision of 
public services to its citizens (Berkovich & Foldes, 2012). After several decades during of operating 
a standardised, uniform educational education system, Israel seems to be on track towards 
abandoning the idea of public education in favour of a market-based model (Nir, 2003). In 
conjunction with privatisation tendencies, external organisations now comprise a significant 
component of Israel’s education system, in the quest to improve student achievement (Berkovich & 
Foldes, 2012); indeed, they have become quite powerful (Gidron et al., 2004). Nevertheless, most 
privatisation processes are partisan; the MOE declares a continuous commitment to public 
schooling (Berkovich, 2014; Sagie & Yemini, 2017). 
In 2008, the Israeli MOE founded a department charged with regulating and overseeing the 
involvement of external organisation in schools. Yet according to the State Comptroller’s Report 
(2011), the significant number of external organisations working within the education system and 
these organisations’ extensive involvement in school affairs indicate the MOE’s inability to manage 
and regulate schools’ relations with external actors (State Comptroller’s Report, 2011). In addition, 
the State Comptroller found this intervention to contribute to the formation of uncontrolled 
privatisation processes in the Israeli public education system (State Comptroller’s Report, 2011). 
Indeed, despite the existence of the MOE’s targeted regulatory department, the Ministry seems 
challenged in finding a sustainable solution for on-going collaboration with external organisations—
due to decentralisation processes and the autonomy of school principals, which enables them to 
introduce external organisations into schools without involving the MOE (Addi-Raccah, 2015). 
Through continuous blurring of public/private boundaries, unintentional competition may develop 
in some spheres between governmental and external programmes and tracks (Brehm & Silova, 
2014).  
In April 2015, the MOE published a Director General’s Circular detailing the Ministry’s 
policy regarding the integration of external educational programmes into education institutes and 
discussing collaborations with external factors. According to this Circular, the MOE is working 
towards establishing collaborations with external organisations and is attempting to formulate a 
policy for integrating these organisations into the education system. The MOE seems to be aware of 
the significant increase in the number of external organisations operating in the education system 
and hence seeks to establish policy—supposedly through on-going dialogue with stakeholders 
involved in the integration of external programmes into schools. Furthermore, the MOE attempted 
to control collaborations by creating a database of all the programmes operating in schools, which 
offers school principals’ and supervisors’ assessments. 
STEM education in Israeli schools comprises a particularly interesting case study regarding 
competition in educational provision, since these subjects can be delivered as an independent 
programme taught at advanced, intermediate, and basic levels or as part of a specific programme. 
STEM programmes tend to be popular and greatly in demand due to higher credits their students 
receive in admission to higher education; their image also benefits from the usually higher socio-
economic composition of the pupils studying STEM subjects (Ayalon & Gamoran, 2000).  
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In the last two decades, several NGOs took on an active role in delivering those 
programmes at public schools through teachers’ training, fund-raising, mentoring, curricular 
development, and other supporting activities. The increased interest in STEM programmes within 
schools and in the general public can be related to the generally low image of public education in the 
Israeli public discourse and the Israeli system’s weak positioning within international ranking 
systems (Pizmony-Levy, 2017). Furthermore, the lesser availability of such programmes in schools 
serving marginalised populations has been criticised.  
Recently, the MOE developed an in-house STEM programme as part of its plan to increase 
students’ performance and study of advanced-level STEM subjects. This programme, called the 
Technological Scientific Reserve, was proposed to schools as a benefits package that includes 
additional funding in teaching hours, mentoring, and teachers’ training. It enters a school essentially 
upon an autonomous decision of the principal, but sometimes is can also be forced on a school by 
the Local Education Authority (LEA). In many schools, this programme was opened on top of 
existing STEM programmes, which often are delivered in close cooperation with NGOs. In this 
study, we focus on schools that run both of the programmes simultaneously (the governmental 
programme and a programme offered by one specific NGO), to assess the potential intra-school 
competition that might occur within schools in this regard.  
Research Objectives 
Connell (2013, p. 101) notes that “[n]eoliberalism seeks to make existing markets wider and 
to create new markets where they did not exist before.” In this study, we aim to further unpack this 
process by critically examining the provision of STEM education in Israeli schools. Neoliberalism 
understands education as process of a human capital formation, aimed to produce an efficient 
workforce that will be productive and competitive in the world economy (Connell, 2013). Thus, 
STEM education comprises a major sphere of action and struggle for this purpose, as STEM 
capabilities are taken as a proxy for the state’s competitiveness in international examinations and the 
public discourse (Yemini & Gordon, 2017). We employ the theory of education governance (Ball, 
2009) and the notion of a ‘competition state’ to address our research questions, focusing on 
neoliberalism as an analytical prism to inform our findings.  
Although several studies deal with private sector involvement in public sector education 
(e.g., Verger, Bonal, & Zancajo, 2016), in this study we tackle a case of unintentional privatisation 
occurring in public schools in Israel. The specific research questions that guided our study were as 
follows: 
(1) What sort of discourse developed around the operation of the public and private 
programmes within public schools? How did different stakeholders perceive 
such a dual STEM provision?  
(2) In particular, how did this dual provision gain legitimacy with public schools?  
 
Research Methodology 
Data Collection 
This study is part of a larger research project concerned with investigation of interactions 
between NGOs and schools in Israel (Sagie, Yemini, & Bauer, 2016; Yemini, 2017; Yemini, Cegla, & 
Sagie, 2018; Yemini & Sagie, 2015), which included interviews, meetings observations, document 
and media analysis, and literature reviews. Here, we focus on a specific form of such interaction, 
analysing a case of the delivery of two particular STEM programmes that operate in Israeli 
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secondary schools; namely, the Technological Scientific Reserve programme operated by the 
Ministry of Education and a similar programme operated by an external NGO. We examined the 
factors influencing the formation and existence of the competition, as well as the different 
motivations and strategies of the stakeholders involved (the school principals, regulatory agents, 
municipal school district personnel, and NGO leadership) in the decision-making process of 
choosing which programme to offer at particular schools. We focus on one Local Education 
Authority (a particular school district comprising four secondary schools) located in central Israel, in 
which all schools adopted the MOE’s STEM programme in addition to a STEM programme run by 
one particular NGO.  
Data collection for this study took place in Israel between July and December 2016. Two 
data collection methods were applied: semi-structured interviews and document analysis. The 
interviews were scheduled with stakeholders independently and conducted by the first author at the 
interviewees’ offices or at coffee shops in locations convenient to the interviewees. The interviews 
lasted between 45 and 120 minutes and were recorded and transcribed. In total, we based our study 
on 11 interviews, detailed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  
Details of the Interviewed Stakeholders 
Additional details Gender Employer  Stakeholder 
National level M MOE Manager of the Technological 
Scientific Reserve Programme  
National level F MOE  Coordinator in the Unit for Inter-
Sectoral Partnerships 
National level, the NGO 
is active nation-wide 
F NGO CEO of the STEM-programme 
NGO  
National level, the NGO 
is active nation-wide  
F NGO Manager of the STEM-programme 
NGO  
Responsible for Middle-
upper class LEA 
F NGO Coordinator of the STEM-
programme NGO at the 
municipality 
Middle class F Public secondary 
school  
School Principal 1 
Middle-upper class F Public secondary 
school 
School Principal 2 
Middle class M Public secondary 
school 
School Principal 3 
Middle class F Public secondary 
school  
School Principal 4 
Middle-upper class LEA F LEA   Manager of scientific programmes at 
the municipality   
Middle-upper class LEA F LEA               Coordinator of the Technological 
Scientific Reserve programme at the 
municipality   
Note: Additional stakeholders who were interviewed in a larger study (12 school principals from LEAs of low, 
intermediate, and high SES; 3 heads of education departments at those LEAs; 12 officials in several NGOs extensively 
working in schools mainly delivering extracurricular activities; 2 parliament members responsible for the Education 
Committee; and 5 past Director Generals of the MOE). 
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The purpose of the interviews was to allow the interviewees to reveal their story, its 
meaning, and their stances and opinions on the subject. Semi-structured interviews allow an open 
conversation between the interviewer and the interviewee, which can develop in different directions 
(Thomas, 2009): They reveal the policy being explored, offer an opportunity to expose the 
environment in which the policy exists, and enable expansive examination of the policy through a 
senior interviewee’s personal acquaintance with the subject matter and the exchange of ideas. This 
type of interview usually begins from the interviewees’ personal stance and professional experience 
and reflects their point of view on the policy, examining the extent of their involvement in it 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2014).    
Moreover, analysis of official documents allows another perspective on the programmes and 
the way in which interviewees choose to present themselves and their policies. Hence, in addition to 
interviews, we collected official documents of the programmes being examined (which reveal the 
programmes’ objectives and characteristics and are published in relevant websites), as well as 
relevant official documents from the MOE or the municipalities involved. In particular, we analysed 
all publicly available policy reports, Director General Circulars, and contents of the MOE website 
related to involvement of external agencies in schooling—comprising over 1,400 pages of 
documentation. We also included promotional materials regarding the NGO and governmental 
STEM programmes, which the relevant actors within both agencies had distributed to the LEA and 
schools. We triangulated data sources and collection techniques to facilitate truthfulness.  
Data Analysis  
To analyse the data we employed Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which focuses on the 
ideologies and philosophies that emerge from the interviews but are not always explicitly expressed. 
This method treats the interviewees as a subject matter that cannot be disconnected from context; 
thus, to properly analyse their statements, their environment and relationships with others are 
addressed. We examined the situation as seen through the eyes of the interviewee and as influenced 
by society; hence, we considered the socio-political context in analysing statements made in 
interview (as per Fairclough et al., 2011).  
The analysis of each interview protocol and text was conducted on three levels: (1) as a 
stand-alone document; (2) in comparison to other texts and interviews; and (3) through a wider 
prism, within the socio-political context as an expression of ideology or a particular viewpoint. At 
each stage we developed a thorough coding system, using inductive and deductive coding 
procedures. The inductive coding was based on repetitive reading of interviews transcripts and 
documents; the codes emerged through the reading process. Examples of inductive codes include 
the role of parents, the importance of STEM as a specific programme, and the personal relations 
that NGO personnel formed with the schools. The deductive thematic coding was informed by the 
theoretical orientation briefly presented above and included codes such as autonomy, accountability, 
reference to policy decisions concerning privatisation, and involved actors. The documents 
regarding the examined STEM programmes were reviewed initially in preparation for the interviews 
and then re-examined at an advanced stage in light of the interview findings. 
Results and Discussion 
The following section is organised according to the two main themes that arose from our 
data. The first theme regards the emergence of market logic due to competition between the two 
STEM programmes within the schools. As previously noted, market patterns result from changes 
and exchanges in the educational world, which influence the schools’ and LEAs’ conduct vis-à-vis 
the MOE and other external organisations. The free market patterns that characterise the business 
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sector were found to redefine the schools’ interactions with the MOE and external organisations and 
create a brand-new perception of an educational world that effectively operates like the business 
sector. The second theme focuses on the emerging power relations between the various entities 
involved in the decision-making process over the choice of STEM programme: the school 
principals, the local authority, and the MOE. Apparently, the process of introducing competing 
STEM programmes into schools and the manner in these programmes operate in schools is shaped 
by these relationships. 
Intra-school Competition as a Buffer for Market Behaviours 
The interview protocols and documents analysed reveal that consistent use of expressions 
traditionally belonging to the business world (such as ‘marketing,’ ‘branding,’ and ‘customers’) 
seeped into the discourse on education as well. Notably, in describing the STEM education at 
schools, all interviewees included expressions taken from the business world. For example, one of 
the school principals discussed the implementation of the MOE STEM programme despite the lack 
of demand for it (business-related terms are emphasised): 
There is no way I will beg the students to sit in the [MOE STEM] class, because they 
think that the work is too hard so they don’t want to, so no. If I’m marketing some 
kind of so-called business and no one is interested, you know, like someone 
who sells clothes and the collection isn’t in demand now, then I won’t sell it, 
I’ll return it to the store and bring a relevant collection. The same with 
everything else…  
 
Another school principal also spoke about the school governance as the authority responsible for 
marketing the two STEM programmes in question:  
It all begins and ends with the school principal’s marketing ability. If you promote 
the programme correctly, and explain its benefits, the collaborations... then you can 
definitely benefit here. So, if you run it correctly – and the school is marketed not 
only by its principal but also through word-of-mouth (parents and students are 
the best marketers through their grocery store or supermarket conversations)… 
there is success. Everybody wants that. 
 
The word ‘marketing’ was repeated frequently throughout the interviews; a key element of bringing 
STEM education into schools seems to be marketing the programmes themselves. The school 
principals’ numerous marketing efforts attest to the educational quasi-market created and confirm 
the existence of competition (Lubienski et al., 2009). The principals seem to be required, as an 
integral part of their job, to proactively promote the proposed STEM programmes (of both the 
MOE and the NGO), to monitor the demand for them, to analyse them, and to meet the outcome 
measures the school committed to in its agreements with the MOE or with the external 
organisation. Notably, such market-based dynamics completely contradict the MOE’s declared 
intentions and declarations advocating for public schooling and seeking to enable only a marginal 
and very specific role for NGOs. Instead, competition became a prominent feature within schools; 
hence the vigorous ‘business talk.’ 
The market approach is evident in the MOE’s budgeting system for schools that run the 
Technological Scientific Reserve programme: schools are rewarded based on the number of students 
per grade who graduate with advanced physics, mathematics, or science classes. Thus, in a process 
typically characteristic of the business sector, to increase the number of students who attain a 
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‘higher-quality’2 matriculation. Indeed, the MOE’s encouragement of principals through incentives 
and rewards mimics management practices in the business sector (Clarke, 2004). 
Moreover, the mere introduction of the MOE’s Technological Scientific Reserve programme 
is a process with business-like characteristics. The programme’s coordinator discusses the process of 
implementing it in schools as follows: 
I want my potential clients to know in advance where they are going, and then they 
will be able to tell me if they even want to be my client. It’s a waste of [teaching] 
hours and public [taxpayers’] money [if clients are not informed in advance regarding 
the programme]. 
 
The use of the word ‘client’ indicates how the coordinator perceives of the schools as potential 
customers for implementing the MOE’s STEM programme, just as in a business transaction. Hence, 
the instructor presents the programme as a service offered to the school. Her remarks clearly refer 
to the fact that public funds are being invested in the programme. Her words make it seem as if the 
public funds are traded in a free market and can be allocated differently should the “clients” prefer 
otherwise, indicating the MOE's entry into such a ‘market.’ 
As noted above, the academic literature presents an image of education systems as 
influenced by neoliberal and decentralisation processes that create an educational quasi-market and 
encourage privatisation (Hursh & Martina, 2016). Our findings confirm the existence of an 
educational quasi-market; although when asked directly, almost all school principals denied the 
presence of competition and claimed that the two programmes are simply run simultaneously with 
no negative consequences to either one. This approach is reflected in one principal’s words: 
No. No competition. I’ve always had 40 students for this and 40 students for that, 
nothing. Not at all… You won’t see this competition in any possible context; these 
are two good programmes … I don’t see anything related to competition, definitely 
not. All the emotions are drained mainly into the selection process and after it’s 
finished the winds calmed and we set sail and that’s where it ends. 
 
However, a broader and deeper analysis of the documents distributed by the programmes’ officials 
and statements made in interviews through an examination of the social contexts and implied 
behaviours reveals clear signs of competition; notably, the principals executed changes in 
programmes according to student demand. For example, one school decided to run the 
Technological Scientific Reserve programme throughout the six years of secondary school, despite 
the MOE’s instructions to the contrary. This continuation over the span of six years is characteristic 
of the competing NGO STEM programme, and therefore the mere change in itself indicates the 
quest to compare the programmes. Another example apparent in three of the schools is the 
establishment of selection processes for the Technological Scientific Reserve programme, 
contradicting the MOE’s guidelines recommending access to all students. Indeed, selection 
processes are included in the competing NGO STEM programme, and this move suggests 
competition between the two programmes. Moreover, it seems that the two programmes are 
designed similarly; even the brochures that we analysed were graphically reminiscent. The 
programmes seem to be becoming even more isomorphic through the process of integration in the 
schools. 
Like the school principals, the manager of the Technological Scientific Reserve programme 
at the MOE denied the existence of competition between the programmes. He claimed that it is 
                                                 
2 ‘High quality’ is a term commonly applied to the completion of advanced levels of STEM subjects in 
matriculation exams. 
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impossible to compete with the Ministry of Education, which is the sole entity responsible for 
education in the State of Israel: “I don’t compete with non-profit organisations, the State cannot 
compete with non-profit organisations, we are the state, which decided upon and implements [the 
policy]. Others complement us by doing really blessed work, and there is a room for everyone.” 
In practice, however, the Ministry indeed appears to be competing with the NGO’s STEM 
programme; our analysis of the MOE manager’s statements made in interview reveals a comparison 
between the two programmes and an attempt to prove why one programme is better than the other, 
as well as the uniqueness of the MOE’s programme. Notably, the comparison between the two 
programmes is not always based on their educational contribution (from a pedagogic-professional 
perspective, they are quite similar), but most of the interviewees also referred to the marketing of the 
two programmes, their prestige among parents and students, the number of students each 
programme is able to recruit, and the way in which each is perceived by the rest of the students at 
the school. This comparison attests to existing competition and to the competitive atmosphere 
between the MOE and external organisations, despite the denial of any such competition on the part 
of the manager of the Technological Scientific Reserve programme at the MOE. In contrast, the 
Ministry of Education's Unit for Inter-Sectoral Partnerships admits to and even encourages this 
competition. In the words of its representative: 
If a school principal searches for a science programme, all the science programmes 
will indeed appear, but the one with the highest rating will appear first. That’s exactly 
what competition is. Usually when we’re coming to buy something, we’ll call 
whatever appears first, right? Not everyone always has the patience to search through 
Google for hours, and this is where competition comes in. It won’t appear as green 
or blue (i.e., it won’t be marked as a MOE programme or an external organisation’s 
programme), but it will appear by rating. So of course, there’s an element of 
competition apparent here and we’re completely aware of it, we want it, we want the 
schools to choose the highest quality programmes. 
 
The programme database created by the Unit for Inter-Sectoral Partnerships includes all the school 
programmes and tracks, whether operated by the MOE or by external organisations. The database 
collects information on school programmes and produces a programme ranking, for a “more 
informed school programmes selection process,” in the words of the Unit’s representative. She 
claims that competition is not only created but also welcomed, because it enables a choice of high 
quality programmes. This finding is in line with the suggestion of Verger, Lubienski, and Steiner-
Khamsi (2016) on the role of the state as an entity encouraging and maintaining competition. 
According to this representative, this database provides a safety net for school principals. In 
establishing the database, the MOE provides a service to school principals—it centralizes and 
concentrates the essential information for the decision-making process, without limiting the 
principal or deciding for him/her which programme to implement. Thus, the MOE encourages and 
supports the principals’ autonomy. However, contrary to the MOE’s expectation, the school 
principals participating in the study did not attest to using the Unit for Inter-Sectoral Partnerships’ 
database extensively, and when they did, it was mainly for technical information rather than more 
profound information regarding quality. 
The external organisation’s representatives interviewed attested to the existence of 
competition and expressed a positive attitude towards it, claiming that competition aids in the 
development and growth of both the schools and the MOE—which is forced to compete with 
organisations that provide schools with educational services. One of the MOE representatives 
interviewed concurs, claiming that “this is healthy competition. It creates a condition in which 
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everyone actually has to keep up to date all the time. Everyone needs to continue to create new 
things. Meaning that the point of the competition is to develop.” 
As Eden (2012) asserts, it seems that the mere existence of an external programme similar to 
the MOE’s own programme constitutes a criticism of the Ministry’s operations and casts doubt on 
its ability to provide quality educational services. In fact, it seems that for the external organisation, 
the MOE is just another player and can be influenced easily by competition to promote and improve 
its services for students. This finding is consistent with the neoliberal approach characteristic of 
most educational systems these days, according to which competition within a quasi-market is the 
best way to promote public efficiency and welfare (Hursh & Martina, 2016), and such competition 
can influence and even change the MOE’s policy (Ball & Junemann, 2012). 
LEA officials who participated in this study also attest to the existence of competition 
between the two programmes, and more broadly even between the MOE and external organisations. 
They present a process of choice and differentiation between the programmes as one in which the 
MOE competes with external organizations as any other market player—not with its presumed 
status as the education system’s regulator. That is, the directors of the LEA are the ones who run the 
competition that takes place within the schools in their district. This finding is consistent with Addi-
Raccah and Gavish’s (2010) study, which emphasises municipalities’ roles in an era of 
decentralisation and the relationship between the municipality and school principals. In this sense, 
the municipality (as represented by the LEA) plays a significant role vis-à-vis school principals, given 
its involvement in determining school policy and status as a source of resources (Addi-Raccah & 
Gavish, 2010).  
Thus, we showed, how the mere existence of two STEM providers within schools fostered 
market-based logic and funnelled the schools’ resources and energy into the competition, thereby 
changing the role of MOE from the regulator to a competitor—just one more service provider in 
the field. As such, the presence of the NGO within schools, which definitely comprises part of the 
privatisation of public provision, was only a first step towards market-based logic. Next, the creation 
and facilitation of direct intra-school competition further added to the transformation of the 
discourse within the schools.  
Who Benefits from Intra-school Competition? 
In the first part of our findings, we showed how market-based dynamics penetrate and 
actually dominate schools’ discourse. Below, we examine the emerging power relations between the 
involved stakeholders in an attempt to understand the effect of these relations on the interaction 
between the MOE and the NGO.  
School principals’ role. Adoption of the neoliberal approach within education and the 
decentralisation policies provided municipalities and gradually schools themselves with autonomy in 
their decision-making; in fact, the responsibility for providing educational services was transferred 
from the government to municipalities and school principals (Robertson & Dale, 2002). 
Municipalities’ and schools’ autonomy coupled with high-stakes accountability regimes (Pizmony-
Levy & Woolsey, 2017) resulted from these institutions’ adopting free-market patterns and 
distancing themselves from a public education system, with the stated objectives of pursuing better 
responses for students’ needs (Verger, Bonal, & Zancajo, 2016). 
The study’s findings support this description; schools were found to enjoy some degree of 
autonomy in selecting and managing the STEM programmes. This is evident in the construction of 
the Technological Scientific Reserve programmes’ application process. Each school principal chose 
the manner in which s/he wished to conduct the application process, although the MOE’s definition 
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of the programme eliminates the need for formal admission. The school principals interviewed 
indicated a need for the application process, given the increased demand for the programme. 
We conducted a kind of internal test that was actually to check some level of 
intelligence, because honestly, I don’t really have a way of sifting through 
applications. We did a short personal interview but we also did a quiz to assess the 
reading of scientific texts … But it’s possible that I’ll have to think of a new model 
that will better screen the students, or that I’ll try to check and if they don’t even 
want this kind of programme, then there’s no need. 
 
School principals seem to have considerable freedom in managing and adapting the programmes to 
their school’s needs. The above-quoted statement reveals a high level of autonomy, whereby the 
decision regarding what to offer and how remain in the hands of the school. Furthermore, the 
principal’s choice of whether or not to offer a programme can vary from year to year, following the 
principal’s own assessment regarding its demand. The principal acts in line with the customers’ 
(parents and students) needs; this is the main consideration guiding the principal in introducing such 
a programme in the first place. In addition, the interviews indicate that each principal has a clear, 
solid agenda that s/he expresses in relation to the programmes available. 
This autonomy creates a link between the principal’s views and his or her conduct towards 
the programme’s success; representatives of both the governmental and the NGO programmes 
choose whether or not to cooperate with a particular principal, since they are aware that the 
programme’s success depends on this key position-holder. This situation emerged clearly in an 
interview with a school principal who insisted on introducing one of the programmes at a school she 
headed in the past; her persuasion efforts at her present school focused on proving the success of 
that previous experience.  
The principals’ considerable use of first-person pronouns when describing the programmes 
is just one of the expressions of their autonomy: “I implemented it as soon as I arrived… I started 
the pilot, I was one of the first principals who got it, in the previous school… as soon as I began 
there, I said, ‘I want it.’ It took me some time to arrive at the format that makes the most sense for 
me.” 
Regarding the NGO STEM programme, principals express an even greater sense of 
ownership and belonging, since the introduction of the programme reflects a principal’s choice to 
implement a class for ‘outstanding’ students within the school. In contrast, the motivation to 
implement the MOE programme quite frequently was financial, as the programme includes 
additional funding (hours) either for schools that choose to implement it or for all schools within a 
district whose LEA decided to implement it. 
Indeed, an analysis of the interviews with the MOE representatives demonstrates that the 
most significant figures in the decision-making process are the school principals. The representative 
of the Unit for Inter-Sectoral Partnerships, which runs the database of existing programmes 
discussed above, stated that principals have the ability to choose between the programmes since the 
Ministry considers them to be “honestly the best professionals out there … today in particular, with 
their experience and training and the way they’re recruited, which is not at all trivial. We trust them, 
the Ministry says ‘I trust you. This is your responsibility.’” 
Alongside the school principals’ great autonomy and significant role in implementing and 
managing the programmes at the schools, other factors emerged from our findings that could 
potentially create obstacles to the principals’ activities: the MOE requires the principal of every 
school that implements the Technological Scientific Reserve programme to appoint a programme 
coordinator who will receive close guidance from one of the MOE officials, in addition to the 
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guidance received from the school principal. Perhaps this is the Ministry’s way of preserving its 
interests, given principals’ high autonomy. In addition, the MOE at the LEA regards the programme 
coordinators as responsible for all issues related to programme implementation: 
I am not a pedagogical guide; I am an administrative guide…. I don’t give them 
pedagogical support. On the contrary, as far as I’m concerned, he [schools’ 
coordinator] is the programme manager… I give him professional tools… there are 
annual tasks, there are training courses, things need to be done to increase 
motivation, to persevere, to recruit the teachers, to recruit the parents, all those 
actions, who does them… enrichment activities, experiential activities, marketing of 
the programme, advertisements, creating school spirit, forming a team… the 
coordinator does all these things and he needs to know how to do them, the 
guidance is very tight… 
 
As aforementioned, school principals dictate which programmes will be offered and how, but they 
are restricted by financial and bureaucratic constrains. Thus, intra-school competition is being 
normalised through the perceived autonomy held by the school principals. Once normalised, it is 
further integrated and displayed through the schools’ routines and relations with the regulatory 
agencies.   
The Local Authority’s standpoint. Decentralisation processes in the education system 
were shown to have completely changed the balance of power between the State, the MOE, the 
LEA, and schools, transferring control over educational policies and activities from the State and the 
MOE to the LEA and school principals (Addi-Raccah & Gavish, 2010; Robertson & Dale, 2002). In 
Israel, The LEA thus plays a central role in the decision-making process and is responsible for the 
introduction of external programmes into the schools. This finding is reflected in the school 
principals’ statements that attest to a good relationship with the LEA representative and to the 
professional and managerial support they receive from the Authority in all matters related to the 
STEM programmes. The programmes’ documents also reflect a major role assigned to the LEA; 
extensive reference is made to it in relation to decision-making processes.  
Analysis of the MOE’s and LEA’s official documents highlights that implementing STEM 
programmes is a municipal agenda, and the LEA invests substantial time and resources into 
promoting the STEM fields within its region; it engages in a selection process to define the STEM 
field on behalf of the district and lists this process as one of its goals. One LEA official used 
powerful language to describe the programme implementation process ("we simply forced the 
schools to implement this programme”), which seems to contradict the sense of autonomy that the 
school principals expressed. These findings align with existing research showing that the LEA has 
come to exert substantial influence on schools, given its involvement in educational policy and its 
status as the source for additional resources (Addi-Raccah, 2015; Addi-Raccah & Gavish, 2010). 
Thus it is not surprising that in interview, the LEA officials, like the school principals, also spoke 
extensively in the first person: "We created a new tradition in the city"; "I choose the programme"; 
"I try to exercise judgment and act in accordance with the principles I previously spoke about"; "In 
my administration... according to my world view…"  
Moreover, LEA officials attest to a good relationship with all school principals, as well as 
with the MOE and NGO personnel. It is the collaboration between the LEA and these two entities 
that dictates what in practice happens in schools—in terms of both pedagogy and management. A 
LEA representative exclaimed: 
That’s the beauty of this issue, and in general of our teamwork: the municipality can’t 
do anything without the Ministry, and the Ministry can’t do anything without the 
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municipality. When you work together—two are greater than one, and it just so 
happens that there’s also great chemistry between us and we get along really well and 
with the supervisor, too. We exchange opinions, get each other’s advice, and 
collaborate. 
 
In fact, the LEA functions as a regulator; it is responsible for implementing STEM programmes in 
schools, it makes the managerial and professional decisions in this regard, and it preserves the two 
programmes that will be implemented in the schools, because they align with the LEA’s interests. In 
the words of one LEA representative: “We have a goal and there are a few means to reach it… all 
means are good.”  
Our findings show that the situation described in the State Comptroller's Report (2011) is 
still relevant today: external organisations are still active in educational service provision within 
schools, with neither a deliberate and planned policy on behalf of the Ministry of Education nor any 
supervision or control over the organisations involved (State Comptroller’s Report, 2011). However, 
it seems that the municipality, which is also responsible for supervision and control, does have a 
deliberate and planned policy. In fact, it takes over from the Ministry of Education, as stated above, 
and de-facto manages education provision. As one LEA official stated: 
I also initiate relationships with the people who create the programmes, with the 
people who widen perspectives, and those I can introduce into the school to open 
new windows onto a new world. That basically means that any external programme 
has to pass through me, regardless of whether it belongs to the Ministry of 
Education or not. 
 
This position of power is reflected in the LEA’s use of the database of programmes that the MOE 
takes pride in having established and run as a rating system. Although this database was supposed to 
be significant in the decision-making process and to provide reliable information about the various 
tracks being offered to schools, it seems that the LEA uses it mainly in a technical manner (i.e., to 
learn which programmes can be applied as municipal suppliers). The LEA officials do not consider 
the database indicative regarding the quality or level of the external programme in question.  
The Ministry of Education’s perspective. As noted above, external organisations have 
become significant within the Israeli educational system, and their entry into the system may even 
reflect a new educational policy (Berkovich & Foldes, 2012). The relationship between the MOE 
and such NGOs are complex; on the one hand, the Ministry views external organisations as a threat, 
since they represent free-market principles and interests that do not necessarily coincide with those 
of the public sector. On the other hand, these partnerships enable the MOE to cope with limited 
resources that affect the delivery of educational services (Almog-Bar & Zychlinski, 2012; Yemini, 
Cegla, & Sagie, 2018). 
 Our findings reveal a new educational realm facilitated by school principals and the local 
authority. The MOE attempts to regulate the partnerships with external organisations. However, the 
MOE’s role is unclear, as it appears to experience great difficulty managing the inter-sectoral 
partnerships and the schools within a broad mechanism similar to those found in the business 
sector. The Ministry, which is unable to interfere in the principals’ process of selecting external 
programmes, has created a database that it considers to be a useful tool. Yet the MOE itself is 
passive with regard to decisions about which programmes to implement, and the creation of the 
database comprises its attempt to consolidate all existing programmes at an initial stage—and at a 
later stage to create supervision and control mechanisms for these programmes. In practice, 
however, it appears to be difficult to consolidate all the programmes implemented in schools: the 
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Unit for Inter-Sectoral Partnerships reports the existence of over 3,000 programmes, but only 1,500 
are found in the database. Notably, the balance of power between the Ministry and the principals is 
the opposite of what one might expect—the MOE needs the principals, acknowledges that they are 
the decision-makers, and tries through them to create a supervision and control mechanism. Indeed, 
a MOE representative summarised the core content of the Director General’s Circular from April 
2015 (mentioned above) as stating the following: “Listen, principal, we trust you, your professional 
and pedagogical judgment, we know you can choose external programmes. We only ask one thing: 
that the plan should be in the database, on either a blue or a green track, and you should give it 
feedback.” 
The MOE’s statements correspond with the existing quasi-market and the strong neoliberal 
perception of the educational reality, alongside the MOE’s inherent passivity. This finding is 
consistent with the way the power relations are presented in the academic literature; Eden (2012) 
argues that the quasi-market created in the education system places it in a passive position vis-à-vis 
external factors and calls for a policy change to regulate the status of both the MOE and the external 
organisations involved. However, it seems that the MOE adopts the neoliberal view because it has 
no choice; it cannot cope with the existing situation and therefore adopts a passive approach. This is 
apparent from the words of the Coordinator in the Unit for Inter-Sectoral Partnerships: 
The mere fact that the MOE has a list of approved projects shows that it is basically 
exempting itself from this dialogue because it says, “I gave you the list, I do not 
approve of what is not on the list, from here on out you have the autonomy to 
decide, you are the operating body.” 
 
Furthermore, the database encourages the competition that already exists between the various 
programmes, including those offered by the MOE itself and by external organisations, such as the 
STEM programmes. The Coordinator in the Unit for Inter-Sectoral Partnerships noted: 
The competition is completely okay and today, in the era of the database, all the 
programmes are equal and it is up to the principals to select them. The instructions 
to the principals are, "You can choose any programme in the blue or green track." 
We don’t tell them to choose only from the green track (the Ministry of Education 
programmes). This means that there is competition, and competition is welcome as 
far as we’re concerned. The attitude at the Ministry today is one that doesn’t see any 
of these organisations as a threat; it sees them as partners. 
 
The MOE is effectively a player in this market, much like the external organisations, and it is unable 
to supervise the programmes and serve as a regulator. Indeed, the MOE does perform some 
supervision over and limitations of the STEM programmes, such as overseeing the number of 
students in particular classes, like the NGO STEM programme. It also provides funding for schools 
and districts offering the Technological Scientific Reserve programme it operates, but not for other 
programmes run by external organisations. This funding comprises a critical component that has 
tilted the scales in favour of the MOE programme. However, the Ministry's representatives made no 
mention of such funding in interview, and the Manager of the Technological Scientific Reserve 
Programme expressed the opinion that the selection of this programme is based on professional 
rather than financial considerations: 
There’s a complete discipline here... because of the curriculum itself, which is unique 
to Technological Scientific Reserve. It can’t be taught by just anyone—no one 
external can replace it. From your questions I get the feeling that you’re interviewing 
me as if I am some third-party here, but I should remind you that this is the MOE. 
We are the sole authority responsible for the education in the country. 
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This last extract reveals the MOE Programme Manager’s insistence on the MOE’s status as the 
ultimate authority in STEM provision, basically denying the existence of competing programmes 
and the MOE’s competitor role assigned to it by the school principals, NGO, and LEA 
representatives. In his perception, NGOs are complementary and marginal to the MOE, as they 
cannot replace it (although it is precisely such a replacement that our study reveals). Nevertheless, 
the MOE unit that is responsible for regulating NGO activities actually organises the field for this 
competition, if merely by presenting the two STEM programmes in the same database.  
Conclusions 
The present study examines the relationships between the MOE and external organisations 
operating in public schools by exploring a case study of competing STEM programmes offered 
within schools by the MOE and by an external NGO. In particular, this study investigates the 
factors influencing the formation and existence of the intra-school competition between MOE and 
the NGO, as well as the different motivations and strategies of the stakeholders involved (school 
principals, regulatory agents, and the external organisations’ leadership) using interviews and 
additional information from the institutions’ websites and official documentation. 
The data analysis reveals a number of points. First, seemingly, all the stakeholders involved 
are acutely affected by the intra-school competition between the MOE and the NGO and within 
schools. This influence is reflected in the widespread and persistent application of business sector 
rhetoric within public schools; all stakeholders described conduct that assumes the existence of 
competition—be it by marketing or branding one of the programmes or by comparing the two 
programmes. The presence of external programmes in public schools is normalised through 
regulatory actions of the LEA and the MOE; however, such normalisation creates a market logic, 
followed by all those involved. The existing competition also affects the way the school principals 
choose to deal with students, parents, the local authority, and even the MOE, thus forming a 
completely different structure of relations in the education arena. 
Second, notably, the competition exists in well-established schools and evolves in 
accordance with LEA regulation. This case study indicates the growing power of the LEA in the 
formation and sustainability of the competition, given that the LEA has a deliberate and planned 
policy regarding integration of STEM programmes (which are in high parental demand), including 
integration of programmes operated by the MOE. In fact, the LEA functions as a regulator, having 
taken over this role from the MOE; it is responsible for implementing STEM programmes in 
schools, and it is the authority making the managerial and professional decisions in regard to all the 
programmes.  
Third, the MOE participates as an equal (and sometimes disadvantaged) player in this 
emerging intra-school education market; much like the NGO, and it is unable to supervise and to 
serve as a regulator, even though the MOE is trying to pursue this role. Furthermore, it seems that 
the MOE is a rather passive actor in the decision-making process regarding schools’ programme 
selection. As mentioned above, the LEA steps in to actually regulate, rather than the MOE. The 
MOE's attempt to direct and supervise the process seems to create an unnecessary bureaucratic 
burden for the local authority and the school principals—as reflected in the fact that they ignore the 
programme rankings and evaluations in the MOE’s database, using this database for purely technical 
informational purposes only. Thus, market-based logic is promoted in public schooling that was 
privatised not only by the NGO but also by the MOE itself, which cannibalises its own schooling 
system by competing with the NGO over STEM programme execution.  
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Such relations merit further exploration in diverse contexts, given the abundance and 
prominence of external entities involved in public education systems. We show here that market-led 
regimes can also develop within schools and not only between schools, as was explored previously 
(Lubienski, 2005; Rowe & Lubienski, 2017; Verger, Bonal, & Zancajo, 2016). Specifically, we call for 
future research focusing on intra-school competition as a prominent site of policy enactment in 
relation to external involvement in public education. By adding quantitative analysis of the scope and 
extent of this phenomenon in different countries and spaces, as well as qualitative studies in 
educational settings of diverse socio-economic status, future research may overcome the major 
limitations of this study; namely, its small scale, specific context, and exploratory nature. While 
privatisation policy is studied broadly, here we show how privatisation is enacted in a particular 
setting where concrete policy is rather vague or altogether missing. We demonstrate the unintended 
emergence of fierce intra-school competition, which shapes school dynamics according to market-
based logic, as the MOE de-facto competes rather than regulates. 
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